Robert M. Mcrae v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Mcrae & Deland, The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, and The Second Injury Fund : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1987
Robert M. Mcrae v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
Mcrae & Deland, The Workers Compensation
Fund of Utah, and The Second Injury Fund : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Elliot K. Morris; Erie V. Boorman; Attorneys for Respondents.
Keith E. Sohm; Sohm & Sohm; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Mcrae v. Industrial Commission, No. 870431 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/636
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. VW21-QA 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT M. MCRAE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
MCRAE & DELAND, THE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, and 
THE SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Case No. 85000739 
Admin. Law Judge: 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Court of Appeals No. 
87-0431-CA 
Priority No. 6 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ROBERT M. MCRAE 
Appeal From a Denial of Motion for Review of 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of 
the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah 
Honorable Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge 
SOHM & SOHM, pc 
KEITH E. SOHM (No. 3038) 
2057 Lincoln Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: (801) 277-5874 
Attorney for Appellant 
ELLIOTT K. MORRIS 
P. O. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0420 
Attorney for Respondents 
McRae and Deland and the 
Workers Compensation Fund 
Industrial Commission 
ERIE V. BOORMAN, Second Injury Fund 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Telephone: (801) 530-6820 
Attorney for Respondent 
The Second Injury Fund 
Erie Boorman 
Second Injury Fund 
160 East 300 South 
P. 0. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P. O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
Elliott K. Morris 
P, O. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0420 
Attorney for Respondents 
McRae & DeLand and Workers Compensation Fund 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 2 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 4 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BY COMMISSION 5 
RELEVANT FACTS 
ARGUMENT 15 
POINT I: MCRAE'S CARDIAC ATTACK ROSE OUT OF 
OR IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. THE 
APPLICANT'S ACTIVITIES AS A TRIAL ATTORNEY ON 
JUNE 28-29, 1985 WERE UNUSUALLY BUSY AND 
UNUSUALLY STRESSFUL, CAUSING EXTREME TENSION 
AND CONCERN 15 
POINT II: THE MEDICAL TESTIMONY OF DR. NULL, 
THE TREATING PHYSICIAN, SHOWS THAT MR. MCRAE'S 
DISABLING MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION WAS WORK-
RELATED. THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE VIEWED IN A 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE APPLICANT 20 
POINT III: A HEART ATTACK WHICH OCCURS AS A 
RESULT OF STRESS AND AGGRAVATION OF A PRE-
EXISTING CONDITION IS COMPENSABLE AS AN 
ACCIDENT UNDER UTAH WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION 
LAW 2 2 
POINT IV: THE MCRAE CASE MEETS THE TEST OF 
THE ALLEN AND LANCASTER CASES, WHICH ADOPT THE 
USUAL EXERTION AND UNEXPECTED RESULT TESTS AND 
MEETS THE TEST THAT HIS EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTED 
SOMETHING SUBSTANTIAL TO INCREASE THE RISK HE 
ALREADY FACED IN EVERYDAY LIFE BECAUSE OF HIS 
CONDITION 30 
POINT V: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ACTED 
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN NOT REFERRING 
THE MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL AND IN NOT 
FINDING THAT THE APPLICANT SUFFERED A HEART 
ATTACK DURING THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AS A 
RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT 36 
POINT VI: ALL DOUBTS ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN 
FAVOR OF A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM DUE 
THE REMEDIAL NATURE OF SUCH LEGISLATION 36 
CONCLUSION 37 
ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM 1: LETTER OF DR. NULL (R.128) 40 
ADDENDUM 2: OPINION OF DR. NULL (R. 125) 41 
ADDENDUM 3: LETTER OF MCRAE, RE: IME (R.424) .. 4 2 
ADDENDUM 4: ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
(R. 434) 44 
ADDENDUM 5: FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND ORDER (R. 390) 48 
ADDENDUM 6: CASE OF JUDGE LEONARD ELTON 54 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 22 Utah P.2d 
368 3, 28 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 427 P.2d 740 (UT 
1967) 3, 25, 28 
Nazum v. Roosendall Construction, 565 P.2d 1144 (UT 
1977) 3, 16 
Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 201 
P. 2d 961 (UT 1949) 3, 18, 31 
Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 (UT 
1980) 4, 22, 37 
Dee Hospital v. Industrial Commission, 138 P.2d 
233 37 
U.S. Steel Corp v. Draper. 613 P.2d 508, (UT 1980) 3, 30 
Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler, 617 P.2d 975 (UT 
1980) 3 
Price River Coal v. Industrial Commission, 49 Utah 
Advance Reports 27 (1986) 3, 27, 28 
Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 163 P.2d 331 3 
Pittsburg Lab v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367 (UT 1983) 25-27 
Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 184 P.1020 (UT 
1919)
 37 
McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (UT 
1977) 4 
Askrew v. Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 134 (UT 
1948) 37 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 25 (UT 
1986) 4, 31 
Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, Supreme Court 
Case 20897 (UT 1987 ) 31 
Little v. J. Karber & Co., 378 P.2d 119 1963) 23 
Archer v. Industrial Commission, 619 P.2d 2 7 <AZ 
1980 4, 24 
ASARCO, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 594 P.2d 107 
(AZ 1979) 24, 25 
City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission, 585 P.2d 
257 (AZ 1978) 25 
Larson's Workman's Compensation Law, Desk Edition, 
Volume 1 and 12.20 (1985) 30 
Larson's Workman's Compensation Law, Volume 1, 38-
40, 38-80, 38183 (b) 35 
Larson's Workman's Compensation Law, 42.21 (1979) 4, 23 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45 15 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 36 
IN TUv :-<>I;KT nb APPEALS O'- THF STATP OF 17 \h 
ROBEKx vi, 
:. ^ . D U S T R I A L ' O M I S S I O N M< I 
MCRAfc * DKLANP. HIF UOlfhP 
COMPFNSATION FF'ND OF U ! -
THV yt-:-r>1.]) J V P ' R Y FUND 
1,'*:; * , :*\ K e s p o n n ^ n 
B R I E F Oh AFP fc.Ll.AST 
IiNL'LSlk* \ L COMMISSION 
C a s e N o , 8 5 0 0 0 7 3 9 
A d m i : - . ..... iftg .-: 
R i c h a r d C. Sums ion 
87-0431-CA 
r S J w j i 1 1< 6 
BRIEF 'BfcR! 
JURISDICTION 
This is an artior, f re I P W and determina1 i .-r of the-
} %
 r • ^  Commission --f Utah, 
'i '" ' ** . ' \ p p « ' ? t l ^  i i - ; 4i*i-*tilt ' f * > r t . : - ' l a i n i 'inli1' 
Ann., $ 35-1-83. 
NA1LKL Ui 1 lit i'KUCh^D.NGS 
Th i y is a • v • : t on f ' - ^ v iev ^ t • ~ • : . ur** ::• 
Indu.'--* r i a I Comm : ^ ^ i .>r , u r d p r * * o m p e n s a t i <;>x bf*r-«*fifs b ^ 
pa;-: * -
disar • ;n^ industrial -lroi'lent, idn;i^i - - a,,j;iM'aiii .. . e: ~ u a 
seve: • nv-' •*; r%r? : ." ! i '.r,,r^t M - . • . • ^ n^causr of stressful 
w o r k .i-i-; . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented to the Court for 
review: 
1. Whether a heart attack which was precipitated by 
the attorney applicant's stressful activities is a compensable 
injury under Utah's Workman's Compensation Act. 
2. Whether the Judge erred in requiring "unusual 
stress" in applicant's work activities in order to recover 
benefits• 
3. Whether the Judge viewed the facts in the light 
most favorable to the applicant, as required by law. 
4. Whether there was sufficient evidence to justify 
a finding that an accident occurred after viewing the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the applicant. 
5. Whether there was sufficient conflicting medical 
evidence to justify submitting the matter to a medical panel 
after viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the 
applicant. 
6. Whether there was, in fact, sufficient evidence 
to enter an order in favor of the applicant, finding that there 
was an accident and that the medical evidence did, in fact, 
support a finding that the applicant suffered a heart attack 
during the course of his employment which aggravated a pre-
existing condition for which he should receive benefits 
pursuant to the Worker's Compensation laws of Utah. 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Statutes, cases, and authorities believed to be 
determinative of the respective issues raised include: 
A. Section 35-1-45 Utah Code Annotated: Employee 
can recover benefits "who is injured, by accident arising out 
of or during the course of employment." 
Section 35-1-77 Utah Code Annotated: Duty of 
Commission to refer case to medical panel. 
B. Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 22 Utah P.2d 
368, where Judge Elton died of a stroke, in which the Court held 
that an aggravation of a pre-existing disease is compensable and 
that an internal failure brought about by exertion in the course 
of employment may be an accident following Powers v. Industrial 
Commission, 427 P.2d 740 (UT. 1967). 
The case of Nazum v. Roosendahl Construction, Utah, 
1977, 565 P.2d 1144, where the court held only slight physical 
exertion is required when an employee suffered a heart attack; 
Purity Biscuit Company v. Industrial Commission, UT 1949, 201 
P.2d 961, in which the court required only usual exertion when a 
truck driver was awarded benefits when his employment aggravated 
and contributed to a spine disease; Dee Hospital v. Industrial 
Commission, 138 P,2d 233; United States Steel Corporation v. 
Draper, Utah, Utah 1980, 613 P.2d 508; Painter Motor Company v. 
Ostler, Utah 1980, 617 P.2d 975; Price River Coal v. Industrial 
Commission, UT 1986, 49 Utah Adv. Rep. 27; Robertson v. 
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Industrial Commission, 163 P.2d 331; Larson on Workers 
Compensation, Desk Edition, Volume 1, Section 38-40, 38*80, 38.8J 
(b); Little v. J. Corber, New Mexico 1963, 378 P. 2d 119, showing 
the recent trend where an employee became emotionally upset 
because of his manager's criticism and suffered and died of a 
myocardial infarction; Archer v. Industrial Commission, Arizona, 
1980, 619 P.2d 27, benefits were granted where an employee becann 
emotionally upset and died of a myocardial infarction. 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 25 (UT 1986), 
The test is not this employee's usual exertion in his employment 
but with the exertions of normal non-employment life of this or 
any other person. 
C. The overriding principle which governs adjudicatio 
of Workers Compensation disability claims is that such claims ar 
to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits and that 
any doubts from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the 
claimant. Prows v. Industrial Commission, Utah 1980, 610 P.2d 
1362; McPhie v. Industrial Commission, Utah 1977, 567 P.2d 153; 
and many others. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the claim of a hard driving, 
intense trial attorney, Robert M. McRae, who is head of his 
partnership's Vernal office. After a week of stressful legal 
activities, McRae was stricken with heart attack symptoms 
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during intense legal practice on Friday, June 28, 1985. He 
continued intense legal activities at his law office in Vernal 
on Saturday morning, June 29, 1985, when the symptoms 
intensified into a full, severe myocardial infarction. He had 
to be rushed the same day by Air Lifeline for medical care in 
Salt Lake City, where his heart stopped beating on two 
occasions, but he recovered after emergency triple bypass 
surgery. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BY 
COMMISSION 
A hearing was held January 16, 1987, followed by the 
Judge's Order dated June 22, 1987, wherein he denied the 
application without referring the matter to a medical panel for 
evaluation (R. 390). Despite th-e treating physician's medical 
opinion that Mthe emotional stress and tension related to his 
occupation are certainly associated with an aggravation to 
produce his myocardial infarction1' (R.P.125), the Industrial 
Commission upheld the Administrative Law Judge by its order 
denying the Motion for Review dated September 9, 1987. (R. 434) 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Inasmuch as neither of the parties objected to the 
Judge's first two findings of fact, presenting a brief resume 
of activities of the appellant, we include those two findings 
as follows: 
1. The applicant is a practicing trial 
attorney with offices in Vernal, Utah and Salt Lake 
City, Utah. On June 28-29, 1985 the applicant 
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sustained a severe heart attack during the course 
of his employment. The diary or schedule kept by 
his secretary shows that on June 28, 1985, he was 
scheduled for depositions in the morning, two 
trials in the Circuit Court, and a meeting with a 
client in the oil fields. Forty-five minutes after 
lunch, he had severe stomach pains prompting him to 
go to the Ashley Valley Medical Center. He had 
blood drawn and underwent an EKG and was told a 
serum test would be made. To his knowledge, he 
went to the oil field to meet with his client. 
Upon his return, he still didn't feel very good. 
He had dinner downtown, because his wife was in 
Salt Lake City. The hospital explained to him the 
reason for the blood serum test. Apparently they 
suspected an ulcer condition. He decided not to 
stay in the hospital, even though he had been asked 
to do so. The following morning, June 29, 1985, he 
returned to the Ashley Valley Medical Center for a 
repeat blood test and another EKG. He then went to 
his office, because he was scheduled to be involved 
in depositions. 
2. The applicant proceeded with the 
depositions the morning of June 29, 1985, but 
around 11:00 a.m. Dr. Norman Nielsen called from 
the hospital and informed the applicant he was 
having a heart attack and he was to get to the 
hospital immediately. He finished the deposition 
in which he was involved and then sent his 
secretary home to get some clothes. He then drove 
three blocks to the hospital. He was then sent by 
lifeline to Salt Lake City, where he was admitted 
to the St. Mark's Hospital. He recalls very little 
that happened after that for a period of some 
fourteen days. He underwent a triple bypass surgery 
on July 1, 1985. He was told that he came, very 
close to dying on a couple of occasions. He was 
released from the hospital on July 16, 1985. He 
returned to active practice around August 12, 1985 
but on a limited basis, avoiding court appearances, 
and has continued to do so to the present time. 
The appellant does not contend that his disabling 
heart attack was caused by the two-day strenuous activities, 
but that the stressful and strenuous activities of those two 
days aggravated a pre-existing condition sufficient to bring on-
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the disabling heart attack resulting in a near-death emergency 
brought under control only because, fortunately, he was in the 
St. Mark's Hospital. His surgeon, Dr. Parrish, states as 
follows (Exhibit D-l, R. 282): 
LV studies and run-offs were not done because of 
the acute nature of the situation and indeed on the 
first injection into the right coronary he went in 
to a total asystole, AV block with asystole, and it 
was rather difficult to resuscitate him. He 
required some closed chest massage and then went 
into ventricular tachycardia situation and required 
temporary pacing by the transvenous femoral route. 
The appellant disagrees with the subsequent 
paragraphs in the Judge's findings of fact. In paragraph 3 the 
Judge erred in finding that there was a long documented history 
of prior heart disease, dating back 15 years or so prior to the 
incident in question. The record will clearly show that though 
the appellant had some angina and an incident or two of chest 
pains over a period of 15 or so years, each time he was checked 
there was NO FINDINGS OF HEART DISEASE. The Judge's 
description of the applicant as being a "hard-driving, self-
employed attorney who has been engaged in heavy trial work for 
mo're than 25 years'* is true. (R. 391) The Judge was further 
correct in finding that: 
It is difficult to quantify the stress associated 
with the applicant's particular practice of law. 
It is probably safe to assume that it was a more 
stressful practice than engaged in by most 
attorneys. . . .chronic job stress is considered 
by cardiologists as one of the factors 
contributing to coronary atheroscerosis. (R. 392) 
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This is not to say that he was not working under 
stressful circumstances. To the contrary, as 
noted previously, the applicant's type and style 
of practice could justifiably be characterized as 
more stressful than most attorneys'. (R. 393) 
The Judge further quoted Dr. F. Clyde Null correctly in his 
paragraph 7: 
Atheroslcerotic heart disease, of course, is 
exacerbated under symptoms of angina pectorus or 
made much worse under periods of emotional stress, 
pressure and tension. Prolonged hours of activity, 
striking degree of physical exertion, exposure to 
cold, or marked emotional pressure and tension 
frequently result in increase symptoms referable to 
the heart. Mr. McRae has underlying 
atherosclerotic heart disease, and of course, all 
of the symptoms of that disorder can be made worse 
by heavy work loads and excessive emotional 
pressure and tension. (R. 392 and 134) 
The stressful activities were not delineated by the 
Administrative Law Judge because neither he nor the Commission 
had access to a transcript. The stressful conditions, relied or 
by the appellant, are as follows: 
1. The appellant is a principle partner in the law 
firm of McRae & Deland. McRae is in charge of the Vernal 
office (R. 36), and Deland handles the Salt Lake City office 
(R. 45-46)• Appellant's personal income during 1985 was about 
$60,000 (R.37). He started out alone in the Vernal office, 
hired one lawyer in 1981 and hired another lawyer in 1982 becaus 
of the rapidly increasing work load. His Vernal business 
continued to expand, but he did not have sufficient office space 
and did not desire to expand his office by adding additional 
attorneys. (R. 107) He found his practice so pressing going 
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into the summer of 1985 that he had to hire more law students 
than usual to do his research. (R. 73, 106) 
2. In answers to questions the appellant stated, 
concerning his activities before June 28 as follows: 
A. Yes. I had pretty heavy personal injury 
schedule. I had a Ford Motor Products liability case 
that Ray Christensen had run me all over on. 
He went on to describe that the plaintiff had fallen in a manhole 
lid which involved the city in the case, and then another injury 
occurred on a rural bridge so that a third defendant was involved 
in the already very complicated case and went on to describe 
another N-L Industries Case and stated, "I just had a whole ton 
of personal injury cases pending." (R. 52) In referring to his 
heavily scheduled calendar book, it reflected only appointments 
made by the secretaries and did not show appointments made by the 
attorneys, lots of walk-in business, more study, research or 
travel. (R. 66) He further described the location of his office 
being right across the street from the court house, brought in 
lots of walk-in business, particularly criminal cases, and that 
he did a lot of D.U.I, cases which were not shown on the 
calendar. (R. 67) He had 200 D.U.I, cases a year. (R. Ill) 
Q. Now let's see, I believe you were trying to 
summarize a little here, in the week prior to your 
heart attack, I think you have talked about several 
cases that you have been involved with quite 
heavily. One was T.W.T. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that quite a heavy case? 
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A. It was a heavy case, Because they had gone into 
Chapter 11 proceedings, and that was a new ball game 
for us, for me. 
Q. You had had a jury verdict just prior to that, of 
how much? 
A. $465,000. 
Q. Then you had a Clayton Case? 
A. Clayton Hatch. 
Q. Yeah. 
A. That is still—I hope it doesn't get appealed to 
the Supreme Court, but that was a--it is a nightmare. 
Q. And then you had a Ford Motor Company liability 
case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Also involved Salt Lake City? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was that case? 
A. That's the one I was taking the deposition on 
when— 
Q. On that Saturday? 
A. Yes. That was a good sized case. 
Q. Some DiU.I. cases about that time? 
A. About 200 a year. 
Q. Then you had a matter in St. George about that 
time? 
A. Yeah. That's true. 
Q. Do you recall what that is? 
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A. Parrish Oil Tools was getting sued on an 
agreement. It was also in the Supreme Court on a 
Motion for Summary Disposition. 
Q. And was that the same Supreme Court case you had 
coming up about the same time? 
A. Yes. (R. Ill) 
Mr. Morris was cross-examining concerning the pressure and 
intensity of jury cases, particularly one he had in April, 1985 
and asked: 
Q. Would you say that jury trials are probably your 
most intense type of work that you do in your 
practice? or did do? 
A. No. 
Q. What would you think of that would be more 
intense than— 
A. The volume. The pace. 
Q. So what you're talking about—you 're trying to 
indicate that the level of intensity had to do with 
the amount of work? 
A. Yes. (R. 105) 
Q. What did you say? 
A. I said that we—the University Law School has 
some type of a service for senior students to make a 
few bucks, and it was just getting to the point, with 
Ford Motor on the one hand and the N.L. Acme on the 
other, and divorce cases going, that we were sending, 
we were calling the U. Research, Student Research 
more and more and more. Because you just plain can't 
go spending a full day in court and a day—you know. 
You just can't do it. And we were just farming more 
and more out to these law students. 
Q. Would it be safe to characterize that your 
practice was growing during this point in time? 
A. At one time it was me alone. Then it was JoAnn» 
and I out there in '81. Then it was Lee and JoAnn 
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and I in the summer of '82. . .And then things just 
kept, and--I just didn't want any more bodies around. 
I just don't like big firms. 
Q. But you had the work for more people? 
A. The work was there. 
Q. Okay. So you relate the intensity of your work 
to the volume of work? Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in the past, when the volume of work had 
become intense, you had gone out and expanded your 
firm, is that correct? 
A. When it was apparent that this was not going to 
go away, that's what we would do. Or what I did. 
Q. But at this point in time in your life, in June 
of '85, you did not want to expand any more? Is that 
correct? 
A. We didn't have any room. (R. 106, 107) 
In looking at the calendars of work activities from 
Mr. McRae's office, cross-examining attorney, Mr. Morris wisely 
observed: 
"Now, Your Honor, these documents are quite 
voluminous, and I want to try to spare the Court the 
necessity of going through the calendar here day by 
day and finding out just how full Mr. McRae's days 
were several months prior to this incident." 
It was observed that the appellant put in a 50-hour week, (R. 
70) but was trying to eliminate Saturday work and that his work 
on Saturday, June 29 was unusual. (R. 44) Because of the busy 
schedule prior to that, he had to schedule this very important 
personal injury case deposition on Saturday, June 29. It was a 
very important case, (R. 44 and 45) and he was pressing to get 
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the case closed; preparation had taken quite a bit of time, and 
he was also working on a very important divorce case with high 
financial stakes, trying to close it up, (R. 45, 46) In 
answer to a question about the early part of the week or the 
week before, McRae answered: 
A. Well, the only thing specifically—I can just 
generally tell you what the calendar was like in the 
first half of 1985. It was just plain hectic. I 
mean it just--
Q. Uh, huh. 
A. You know, the girl's book as tight and as fast as 
they can, and it has got worse and worse and worse. 
Q. What about June of 1985? 
A. It was no better. (R. 54) 
Speaking specifically of the week starting with 
Sunday, June 23 the appellant had spent a day or two at Lake 
Powell on a house boat, but was called Sunday the 23rd back to 
the office for a serious emergency case and had to report to 
the office on Monday, June 24 regarding something to do with an 
emergency with Hatch River Expeditions. (R. 55) He also had a 
matter in St. George on that Monday and in the Supreme Court and 
some problems with the bankruptcy matter hanging over from the 
previous week. (R. 53) After a busy week, Friday, June 28 
involved depositions in the morning, two trials in the Circuit 
Court and a meeting in the afternoon with a client in the oil 
fields. (R. 37) Because of pain in his abdomen, which he 
suspected might be an ulcer, he went to the hospital after lunch 
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on Friday, where he was given an EKG test and blood serum test. 
They requested he stay in the hospital for the afternoon and 
night, but he felt the pressure of his work and afternoon 
schedule were more important. (R. 41, 42, 43) He then left the 
hospital with a promise to report in early Saturday morning at 
9:00 for repeat tests and met his clients in the oil fields 
working with him until about 5 or 6:00 p.m. (R.42) He had 
dinner downtown since his wife was out of town and reported for 
the repeat EKG and blood test at the hospital at 9:00 Saturday 
morning, June 29. He then went back to the office to take care 
of a deposition, though he usually did not work on Saturdays (R. 
44-45), prepared his client for a half-hour or so and then met 
with Steve Nebeker and the reporter for taking deposition. At 
about 11:00 Dr. Nielson called from the hospital and told him he 
was "infarcting". "You're having a heart attack. Get over 
here." McRae told him he would be there as quick as he could, 
but took time to finish the deposition, sent his secretary to 
pick up his clothes, and drove three blocks to the hospital, 
where he was immediately attached to equipment and sent by Air 
Lifeline to the St. Mark's Hospital under the care of Dr. Clyde 
Null. After arriving by air in Salt Lake, he did not remember 
much from that time until July 14. Apparently, he was not in a 
coma but did have amnesia. He was apparently a very cantankerou 
patient and was released to go home July 16. (R. 50) The 
appellant had a triple bypass surgery on July 1, 1985 (R. 56) 
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and nearly died twice, requiring emergency resuscitation. (R. 
58) After being released from the hospital July 16, he returned 
to the office an hour or so a day but did not start regularly 
until August 10 or 12. (R. 60) He did not return to court work, 
indicating that it scared him to go back into court. (R. 61) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: MCRAE'S CARDIAC ATTACK AROSE OUT OF OR IN THE 
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. THE APPLICANT'S ACTIVITIES 
AS A TRIAL ATTORNEY ON JUNE 28-29, 1985 WERE 
UNUSUALLY BUSY AND UNUSUALLY STRESSFUL, CAUSING 
EXTREME TENSION AND CONCERN. 
Section 35-1-45 provides an employee "who is injured, 
by accident arising out of or during the course of employment 
shall be entitled to compensation." It is admitted that Mr. 
McRae, as a trial attorney, engages frequently in office 
activities and in trial work and, as shown by his report of his 
activities the week prior, he travels to Salt Lake occasionally 
and confers with clients, but by no stretch of the imagination 
and certainly not supported by the evidence, could the Judge find 
that his activities during the prior week and on Friday and 
Saturday, June 28 and 29 were usual*and ordinary activities for 
he or any other attorney and certainly were unusually stressful 
as compared to the average man. As observed by the Judge, the 
Applicant engaged in a deposition in the morning, followed by twc 
trials in the Circuit Court, and then a trip out to the oil 
fields to meet with a client. When he had severe stomach pains, 
he went to the Ashley Valley Medical Center for a checkup. After 
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tests, it was suggested that he be admitted to the hospital, but 
he declined to do so and continued his strenuous activities of 
that day, which included a trip to the oil fields to meet with a 
client. There is nothing in the record that would indicate two 
trials and a deposition in one day were a usual activity for Mr* 
McRae. It was not a usual day. It was a very strenuous and 
stressful day, and the fact that he had to travel to the oil 
fields to meet with an important client and return and then do 
preparations for a deposition to be taken on Saturday, only adde< 
to the stress and tension. Mr. McRae enjoys relaxing and 
boating, but was not able to take his boat out on Saturday the 
29th because he had to tend to further legal activities and 
engage in a very stressful deposition, which was very important 
to his client and that case. Before engaging in the deposition 
he went to the Ashley Valley Medical Center again Saturday 
morning for repeat blood tests and another EKG, and then went to 
his office, where he engaged in the taking of a deposition. 
During the course of the deposition and around 11:00 a.m. he was 
called by his doctor and told to report to the hospital, that he 
was having a heart attack; and, of course, that added to the 
stress and tension. 
ONLY SLIGHT PHYSICAL EXERTION IS REQUIRED 
The compensability of an employee's death arising from 
a heart attack subsequent to unusual physical exertion while in 
the course of employment was addressed in Nazum v. Roosendahl 
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Construction & Mining Corp,, Utah, 565 p.2d. 1144 (1977). There, 
the employee drove a ten-wheel dump truck for a construction 
company. Usually, the dump bed was activated by a switch in the 
cab, but on the day of the accident this switch malfunctioned anc 
the employee had to step down from the cab and activate a 
secondary device located in the passenger side of the dump bed. 
Evidence adduced at the hearing indicated that the employee had 
climbed down from the cab and activated the manual device at 
least six times. Later, as he stepped down from the cab to 
activate the device, he stumbled to the ground, suffering from a 
heart attack, and died within minutes thereafter. 
The Industrial Commission denied compensation, ruling 
that the employee's death resulted from a pre-existing heart 
condition and not from the exertion required by his employment. 
The medical testimony presented during the hearing indicated thaJ 
an extra burden had been placed on the employee's heart as he 
stepped from the cab several times, enhancing the heart's 
abnormal rhythms which contributed to his death. 
Reviewing this evidence, the Supreme Court concluded: 
Even though it is true that [the employee] had the 
pre-existing heart weakness described above, the 
immutable facts are: that he was working on his 
job; that because of a mechanical defect in his 
large truck he was put to the necessity of 
repeatedly hoisting himself up these abnormally 
long steps into the cab and was thus put to a 
greater exertion than normally would have been 
required if the truck had been operating properly; 
and that this placed such stress on his already 
weakened heart that it could not cope with the 
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burden; wherefore, it failed and resulted in his 
death. 
Based upon this interpretation of the evidence, the Court held 
that the employee's death resulted from an accidental occurrence 
that arose out of and in the course of his employment, and 
remanded the case to the Industrial Commission to make the 
appropriate award. Merely climbing in and out of the cab was 
found to be sufficient exertion to recover benefits. 
ONLY USUAL EXERTION IS REQUIRED 
The landmark case of Purity Biscuit Co, v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 201 P.2d 961 (1949), requires only USUAL 
exertion. There, the employee, a delivery truck driver, was 
awarded workmen's compensation when it was determined that his 
employment aggravated and contributed to a diseased spine. - The 
accident occurred when the employee pressed down on the brake 
pedal of his truck, which created pressure on an intervertebral 
disc, forcing it to protrude into his spine causing great pain t 
the employee and paralysis of his legs. The employer appealed 
the Industrial Commission's award. 
The issue as framed by the Utah Supreme Court was 
whether the employee had suffered a compensable accidental injui 
where the employee had only engaged in normal exertions require( 
daily in his work. Affirming the award, the Court propounded tl 
following significant principles of workmen compensation law: 
(1) Workmen's compensation coverage is extended to 
an employee who becomes disabled through internal 
failure which is caused by ordinary exertion, 
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without unusually heavy labor in excess of the 
employee's ordinary duties; (2) the terms "injury 
by accident" only require that the result be 
accidental, which in turn is satisfied if the 
injury or death is unexpected and unintentional; 
and (3) workmen's compensation coverage is to be 
liberally construed and should be resolved in 
favor of recovery if there is doubt. 
In Purity Biscuit, Justice Wolfe, in a specially 
concurring opinion, stated that evidence of unusual exertion was 
not required for an award of workmen's compensation where 
evidence established that the employee's usual exertion in the 
course of his employment caused his injury. He did note, 
however, that evidence of unusual exertion immediately prior to 
the injury is a higher quality evidence that more clearly 
establishes that the employment was the actual cause of, and not 
merely coincidental to the injury or death. Harmonizing the 
majority opinion with Justice Wolfe's concurring opinion, it is 
clear that lack of evidence showing unusual exertion is not fatal 
to a claim for compensation, arising from internal failure, 
although its presence is helpful in establishing causation. The 
principles propounded in Purity Biscuit were reaffirmed in 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah, 617 P.2d 693 
(1980), wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is equally well settled the injury 
received may be accidental even though the 
exertion is that required in the ordinary course 
of employment. If an employee incurs unexpected 
injuries, including internal failures, caused by 
the ordinary duties of his employment he is 
eligible for compensation under [Utah Code Ann.] 
35-1-45. 
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Obviously, the Judge should have found that the events 
of Friday June 28 and Saturday June 29, during the course of his 
employment were exceedingly stressful, caused greater than usual 
stress, caused great tension and that the heart attack that 
occurred was unanticipated and unforeseen and an accident for 
which the Applicant is entitled to Workman's Compensation 
benefits. All attorneys know the stress of Court work, and 
many, even experienced attorneys, experience nausea and diarrhea 
before even minor trials. 
POINT II: THE MEDICAL TESTIMONY OF DR. NULL, THE TREATING 
PHYSICIAN, SHOWS THAT MR, MCRAE9S DISABLING 
MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION WAS WORK-RELATED. THE 
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO THE APPLICANT. 
Dr. F. Clyde Null, M.D. F.A.C.P., is a specialist in 
cardiovascular disease, internal medicine, is a diplomat in the 
American Board of Internal Medicine and practices at the St. 
Mark's Hospital. The Commission have frequently used him for 
medical panels in determining the complex questions involving th 
cardiovascular field; and for many years, Dr. Null has provided 
the Commission with the benefit of his extensive experience in 
determining the cause and rating of heart disease problems. 
In his letter of September 12, 1985 (Exhibit A-l, 
p. 3), Dr. Null states as follows: 
Atheroslcerotic heart disease, of course, is 
exacerbated under symptoms of angina pectorus or 
made much worse under periods of emotional stress, 
pressure and tension. Prolonged hours of 
activity, striking degree of physical exertion, 
exposure to cold, or marked emotional pressure and 
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tension frequently result in increase symptoms 
referable to the heart. Mr. McRae has underlying 
atherosclerotic heart disease, and of course, all 
of the symptoms of that disorder can be made worse 
by heavy work loads and excessive emotional 
pressure and tension. 
The doctor further states in the same Exhibit, p. 1, referring tc 
the Applicant, Mr. McRae, as follows: 
He exhibits a 35% impairment and Class II 
symptomatology on the basis of the above diagnosis. 
He exhibits this permanent physical impairment and 
will require continuing medical therapy for an 
indefinite period of time. In my opinion, the 
emotional stress and tension related to his 
occupation are certainly associated with an 
aggravation to produce his myocardial infarction. 
(R. 125) 
We must note and take into account the fact that Dr. 
Null was his treating physician during his pre-surgery care and 
followed the surgical procedures and then was his doctor in all 
post-surgery developments. He prepared the medical records, 
instructed in the taking of medical tests and read the results. 
He had the opportunity of interviewing with his wife and with 
Mr. McRae himself and observing first-hand all of the events 
surrounding his heart attacks and the reasons therefore. 
On the other hand, Dr. Perry, who was not the treating 
physician, but was hired by the Defendants to review the 
Applicant's condition, set up a brief appointment and saw the 
Applicant for a few minutes, listened to his heart, briefly 
checked over the records placed in his hands, and then answered 
the questions posed by the Defendants audibly so that the 
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Applicant could hear them, all as described in the Applicant's 
letter, attached hereto as Exhibit 1 of September 18, 1986 in 
paragraph 2. He states: 
Dr. Perry was a gross disappointment. His 
nurse took my blood pressure, weight, and put me 
in the examining room. Dr. Perry came in in about 
10 minutes. He opened my file which had been sent 
to him by the Fund or Commission and immediately 
asked what he was supposed to do and why was he 
involved. He read the transmittal letter which 
contained, 1 believe, four questions for him to 
answer. He read through the file, which 
apparently was a copy of Dr. Null's office file 
dated back to 1970 which covered periodic routine 
physicals. He ask a few questions and 1 again re-
told my story of the events leading up to my heart 
attack. He had me lie down on the examining 
table, listened to my heart with a stethoscope and 
told me to put my shirt back on. He then re-read 
the questions, the first one, if I remember, in 
substance ask for his opinion asking whether or 
not work related stress contributed to the heart 
attack and then he mumbled "no". He read the 
other three questions and mumbled "yes" as to 
each. He then said he would read my file which he 
had not read prior to my seeing him, and write his 
report. (R. 424) 
The brief one-page report of Dr. Perry's (R. 226) was 
the basis for Judge Sumsion's denial of benefits to the 
Applicant. (R.394) Certainly such a report should not be given 
equal standing with the report of the treating physician, but if 
it is given any credence, it should be a basis for submission of 
the questions of aggravation and causation to a medical panel. 
The law is well established that in cases of doubt or conflict 
of opinion, the evidence should be viewed in light most 
favorable to the Applicant. (Prows v. Industrial Commission, 
610 P.2d 1362 (UT 1980) 
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POINT III: A HEART ATTACK WHICH OCCURS AS A RESULT OF STRESS 
AND THE AGGRAVATION OF A PRE-EXISTING HEART 
CONDITION IS COMPENSABLE AS AN ACCIDENT UNDER UTAH 
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAW. 
EMOTIONAL STRESS AND STRAIN 
More recent cases in the workmen's compensation area 
have addressed compensability for injuries induced or caused by 
the employee's emotional stress while in the course of 
employment. Indeed, recent decisions seem to establish a trend 
where employees are awarded compensation for injuries caused by 
emotional stress or strain: "The first category is that in whic 
a mental (as distinguished from a physical) impact or stimulus 
results in a distinct physical injury. Here the decisions 
uniformly find compensability." Larson, Workman's Compensation 
Law 42.21 (Matthew Bender, 1979). More specifically, the trend 
is to award compensation in heart attack cases where such in 
induced by emotional stress or strain while in the course of 
employment: 
When the caused component in a heart failure 
or cerebral hemorrhage case is mental, nervous, 
psychic or emotional rather than physical, the 
commonest legal question has been whether this 
could be said to be an 'injury' for compensation 
purposes. As will be shown later, the cases are 
virtually unanimous in holding that such a result 
is indeed an 'injury', although the o.rigin of the 
episode may have been nonphysical. 
A case indicative of this recent trend is Little v. J. 
Korber t Co., 71 N.M. 294, 378 P.2d 119 (1963). There, the 
employee, a department manager, became upset when he discovered 
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that a clerk had made an error on a charge ticket. The employee 
made known his anger over the error to the company's office 
manager. Later that morning, the employee collapsed and died 
near his desk. The trial court found that the employee, while i 
the course of employment, became emotionally upset and as a 
result thereof, died of a myocardial infarction. Compensation 
was awarded to the employee's dependents. Both the employer anc 
its insurance carrier appealed contending that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that the cause of the employee's deatl 
was his employment. 
Reviewing the lower court record, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court found that the medical experts agreed generally 
that "an emotional upset results in stress upon the heart as mu< 
as physical stress, and that anger may be a precipitating cause 
of heart attacks, either disabling or fatal." Based upon this 
conclusion the Supreme Court affirmed the judgement of the lowe 
court and held: 
After a painstaking review of the record, it is our 
considered judgment that the evidence meets the 
requirements of substantiation and we hold that the 
evidence in this case establishes a causal 
relationship and that [the employee], in the course 
of his employment, became emotionally upset, 
suffered an accidental injury, and as a result 
thereof died of a myocardial infarction... 
In a recent case, Archer v. Industrial Commission, 12 
Ariz. 199, 619 P.2d 27 (1980), the court reviewed an award of 
death benefits to dependents of a worker who had died from 
myocardial infarction. The court in that case, citing ASARCO, 
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Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 122 Ariz. 2412, 594 P.2d 107 
(Ariz. App. 1979) and City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission, 
120 Ariz. 237, 585 P.2d 257 (Ariz. App. 1978), stated that "the 
test for determining the measure of emotional stress is not a 
subjective one", but "an objective one, (i.e., do the duties 
imposed by the job subject the claimant to greater stress than 
his fellow employees?)". 
This trend is followed in Utah. 
The standard for evaluating heart attack cases in the 
State of Utah is outlined in the 1983 Pittsburgh Testing 
Laboratory v. Keller case, 657 P.2d 1367, which quotes the Powers 
v. Industrial Commission 1967 Case 427 P.2d 740, a case involving 
a pre-existing heart condition indicating, in that case, the 
Court said: 
The law is well settled that the aggravation or 
lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an 
industrial accident is compensable and that an 
internal failure brought about by exertion in the 
course of employment may be an accident within the 
meaning of the act. 
The Applicant showed by preponderance of the evidence 
that he was engaged in an unusual stressful day's activity on 
Friday, June 28, and there was no evidence to refute that. The 
events following his tensions and stressful day were certainly 
unanticipated and unforeseen; and, therefore, an accident as 
defined by the Workman's Compensation statutes. The recent 
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Keller case quoted above in relating the term "accident" to a 
heart attack, the Keller case defines it as follows: 
It (the term accidental) simply means that the 
effort exerted, considering the position in which 
the workman was put by the work being done at the 
instant of the injury, was such that an injury, 
unanticipated and unforeseen, resulted to the 
workman. 
In the Keller case, we find a striking similarity to 
the McRae case before us. Mr. Keller had had a previous 
myocardial infarction in 1965, followed by exertional angina. H 
was hospitalized in 1973 for a suspected acute infarction. In 
1978 he was diagnosed as having a myocardial infarction; and 
further testing revealed severe coronary arterial disease of lor 
standing, which was treated by an extensive coronary bypass 
surgery. Four days before his death, Mr. Keller had been in a 
work situation in the dome of a building where the heat was 
excessive, described as "very warm and extremely stuffy." Mr. 
Keller had to be removed from the area and given oxygen; but 
after resting, he drove himself back to his home. Three days 
later, Keller died, and benefits were granted. Mr. McRae's was 
more fortunate and certainly has a more convincing case because 
his symptoms and infarction occurred immediately at the time of 
his most extreme stress, not three days later, and he had to be 
immediately hospitalized. In the Keller case, the medical pane 
did not link Keller's heart attack with the stresses he 
experienced in the ceiling of the building four days earlier. 
However, Mrs. Keller objected to the Findings of the medical 
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panel and introduced the testimony of Dr. Frank Yanowitz, who 
testified that the stress he experienced in the ceiling affected 
Mr. Keller's heart, and this subsequently lead to the heart 
attack which he experienced three to four days later. The 
Administrative Law Judge adopted the Findings of Dr. Yanowitz an 
rejected the medical panel report and found that the events in 
the ceiling produced a coronary insufficiency which eventually 
lead to the deceased's myocardial infarction and ultimately 
resulted in his death. The Industrial Commission upheld the 
Administrative Law Judge's opinion, and subsequently, the Suprem 
Court upheld the Commission. 
Again we urge that the fact of the present case of 
Robert McRae are even more convincing in favor of a recovery tha 
that of Mr. Keller. 
In the case of Marie T. Mabbott, involving the heart 
attack death of Fred Mabbott v. Price River Coal Company, the 
Judge's Order, dated December 20, 1984, found that Mr. Mabbott, 
who was found dead after sitting down to eat his lunch, had diec 
of a coronary insufficiency even though three doctors agreed thf 
Mr. Mabbott was a high-risk candidate for a sudden cardiac deatl 
Dr. Perry, as a medical panel, and Dr. Yanowitz determined that 
though the Applicant was a high risk because of his heart 
condition, age, hypertension, diabetes, gout and other problems 
it appeared that he was engaged in a stressful job and that 
emotional stress and pressures could aggravate and further 
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increase the myocardial oxygen demands and that there was a 
causal relationship between the activities that Mr. Mabbott 
performed and the stresses that he was under which eventually 
lead to his demise. There was only circumstantial evidence 
concerning the activities the deceased was engaged in at the 
time. Benefits were allowed, and the Commission upheld the 
Judge, and the Supreme Court upheld the Commission. The case is 
cited as Price River Coal v. Industrial Commission, 49 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 27, December 31, 1986, and found, under the Allen case that 
the decedent died "by accident since his heart attack was 
certainly an unexpected or unintended" event that resulted in hi 
death. As indicated in the Elton case, stress can be and is 
analogous to exertion. This is a well-accepted principal in 
Utah. 
In the case involving Judge Leonard Elton, who died 
May 13, 1970 ^s the result of a stroke, Elton v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 22 UT 2d. 368, the Court, after carefully 
analyzing the Judge's activities on the Bench, observed that 
"this Court has previously determined that aggravation of a pre-
existing disease by an industrial accident is compensable and 
that an internal failure brought about by exertion in the course 
of employment may be an accident within the meaning of the Utah 
Workman's Compensation Act,", following the "Powers v. 
Industrial Commission" case referred to above. The case refers 
to some of the difficult and sensitive cases he was hearing at 
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the time and observed that he was hearing extensive arguments on 
one of his cases. In between some of these events he was home 
ill and then returned to work during April, then on Wednesday, 
May 6 he had returned to work carrying a full case load. On May 
12 he made a ruling on an important case and heard an annulment 
and a divorce. He had a jury case scheduled for May 13, but he 
died that morning. The testimony indicated that his health was 
deteriorating, brought about by stresses of highly sensitive 
cases handled by him the last six weeks of his life. His 
physician testified that Judge Elton suffered from a vascular 
disease, resulting from insufficient blood supply to the brain, 
and that this condition was aggravated by the stresses of Judge 
Elton's employment and that these stresses were the principal 
factors in cutting short his life. The Court found as follows: 
The record supports the trial court's conclusion 
that Judge Elton died as a result of an accident 
arising out of or in the course of his 
employment. . . (Addendum 6) 
I am sure that the appellant judges and all attorneys 
will freely acknowledge that there is much more tension, 
pressure, stress related to practicing law as an attorney before 
the Courts than there is as in a Judge hearing the matters. 
Judge Elton's last day certainly was not as stressful as that of 
June 28th day of the Applicant's. The Judge Elton's case is ver 
analogous to the case of the Applicant, Robert McRae. Mr. McRae 
had a pre-existing vascular disease resulting in insufficient 
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blood supply and had symptoms on and off in the prior weeks and 
before that indicating his pre-existing condition. As the doctc 
testified in the Elton case, so Dr. Null presented evidence in 
the present case that the stresses connected with the current 
activities of the Applicant aggravated and brought about the 
heart attack of June 28 and 29. (R. 125) 
In the United States Steel Corporation v. Draper, 613 
p.2d 508 (Utah 1980) a case where the deceased workman suffered 
fatal heart attack after running to the aid of a fellow employee 
the Court reiterated as follows: 
The fact that the deceased had a pre-existing 
diseased condition of his heart does not preclude a 
finding that his death resulted from an accident in 
the course of his employment. This Court has long 
ago and repeatedly recognized that, despite any 
pre-existing condition of disease or disability, if 
there is an incident, properly regarded as an 
accident in the course of work which adds to or 
aggravates that condition, any resulting injury is 
compensable. 
The Powers case, of course, stated that: 
The law is well settled that the aggravation or 
lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an 
industrial accident is compensable... 
The ultimate authority, Professor Larson, states as follows: 
Pre-existing disease or infirmity of the employee 
does not disqualify a claim under the 'arising out 
of employment' requirement if the employment 
aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the 
disease or infirmity to produce the death or 
disability for which compensation is sought. 
(Desk Edition, Vol. 1, Section 12.20, 1985). 
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POINT IV: THE MCRAE CASE MEETS THE TEST OF THE ALLEN AND 
LANCASTER CASES WHICH ADOPT THE USUAL EXERTION AND 
UNEXPECTED RESULT TESTS AND MEETS THE TEST THAT HIS 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTED SOMETHING SUBSTANTIAL TO 
INCREASE THE RISK HE ALREADY FACED IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
BECAUSE OF HIS CONDITION. 
In considering this case in the light of two recent 
cases, Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 {UT 1986) and 
Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, Supreme Court No. 20897 (UT 
April 20, 1987), it appears the Supreme Court has adopted the 
Purity Biscuit Company test that an "ordinary or usual exertion 
is sufficient to meet the "by accident" definition. On page 
three of the Lancaster case which involved a heart attack, quotec 
Allen as follows: 
In Allen, we embraced the definition of Mby 
accident" first formulated in Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 
(1949). We rejected the position that an accident 
requires an unusual event or occurrence. 729 P.2d 
at 20. An ordinary or usual exertion is sufficient 
to meet the "by accident" definition if "the result 
of an exertion was different from what would 
normally be expected to occur, the occurrence was 
unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and therefore by 
accident." 729 P.2d at 22. The critical factor 
when determining whether an incident is by accident 
is unexpectedness. 729 P.2d at 22. 
Despite a finding that the heart attack was 
unexpected, the administrative law judge concluded 
there was no accident primarily because the 
claimant was undertaking his usual work duties. 
That conclusion cannot stand in light of the 
standard set forth in Allen. Although the claimant 
had experienced similar pains four days earlier, he 
had not been advised of the etiology of those pains 
and he had no forewarning that they would occur 
again on February 17. Moreover, there is nothing 
in the claimant's job duties to suggest that he 
would suffer a heart attack. There is overwhelming 
evidence that the claimant did not intend to have a 
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heart attack, nor did he anticipate one. These 
factors, taken together with the finding that the 
myocardial infarction was the "unexpected" result 
of an exertion in the workplace, require the 
conclusion that the heart attack was "by accident." 
Our case, being a heart attack case, is similar to the 
Lancaster. Like the Lancaster case, the McRae heart attack 
meets the two tests of an accident as stated above: 
1. The heart attack occurred during the course 
employment while the applicant was under unusual stress evi 
though only usual or ordinary stress or exertion is required. 
2. The event was unexpected. As stated above, 
"There is overwhelming evidence that the claimant did not inte 
to have a heart attack, nor did he anticipate one." He, in fac 
had an active week qirite free of stress and then Friday though 
he had an ulcer problem. 
Since we have admitted that McRae had a pre-existing 
heart condition, two more tests apply. The Allen and Lancaster 
cases say we must analyze the causal connection between the hea 
attack and the working condition to find both a legal cause and 
medical cause: 
1. Under legal cause a claimant with a pre-existi 
condition must show that the employment contributed somethi 
substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyd 
life. (729 P.2d 26) 
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2. Under the medical cause the claimant must show th< 
stress, strain or exertion required by his occupation led to th< 
resulting injury or disability. (729 P.2d 27) 
As to (1) legal cause, the claimant worked at a very 
stressful job as shown on pages 8-13. In fact, the Judge so 
found: 
It is difficult to quantify the stress associated 
with the applicant's particular practice of law. 
It is probably safe to assume that it was a more 
stressful practice than engaged in by most 
attorneys, but there is no indication that it was 
uniquely stressful. (R. 392) 
This is not to say that he was not working under 
stressful circumstances. To the contrary, as 
noted previously, the applicant's type and style 
of practice could justifiably be characterized as 
more stressful than most attorneys. (R. 392) 
Furthermore, the stress was extreme on this particular 
Friday and Saturday because of the Circuit Court trials, 
appointments and rush travel to the outfields delayed because of 
an unexpected medical checkup. A stressful deposition on 
Saturday was unusually stressful and unique, not only because it 
was a crucial deposition, but also because McRae did not 
ordinarily work on Saturday. 
As to (2) medical causes, the medical expert and 
treating physician, Dr. Null, stated: 
In my opinion, the emotional stress and tension 
related to his occupation are certainly associated 
with an aggravation to produce his myocardial 
infarction. (R. 125) 
Mr. McRae has underlying atherosclerotic heart 
disease, and, of course, all of the symptoms of 
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that disorder can be made worse by heavy work 
loads and excessive emotional pressure and 
tension, (R. 128) 
Neither the Judge nor Dr. Perry agreed that there was 
a medical causation, but both came to that erroneous conclusion 
on the false premise that the last week and that particular 
Friday and Saturday, dates of the heart attack were not unusual 
to the claimant. 
Dr. Perry erroneously stated and based his erroneous 
findings on the following: 
There was no change in his job requirements, the 
physical activity, number or hours worked or 
stress in the months prior to his myocardial 
infarction, compared to the years before this 
occurred. (R. 226) 
The Judge erroneously adopted the erroneous findings 
Dr. Perry as his own (R. 394) and further found: 
No convincing evidence of any unusual or acute 
stress with regard to the applicant's work 
activities on the date of, or preceding, the onset 
of the symptoms. . . during that last week of 
June, 1985, there wasn't any significant change in 
his job requirements, the level of physical 
activity, the number or hours worked, or the 
stresses he experienced in the months prior 
thereto. (R. 393) 
Dr. Perry and the Judge erred in two regards: 
Error Number 1: The record (Brief Pages 8-15) clearl 
shows unusual and increasing stressful conditions that last wee 
climaxed by increasing symptoms Friday and Saturday. (R. 41-4£ 
Claimant's work load was so heavy during that last week that he 
had to schedule a stressful deposition on Saturday when he 
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usually rested. (R. 44) Obviously this week was an unusually 
stressful six-day week. 
Error Number 2: The test required by the Allen case is 
not comparing the claimant's workload or work conditions with his 
own prior employment work load or work condition but must compart 
the claimant's exertions to stress during the week of June 23-29 
and Friday and Saturday, June 28 and 29 with "the exertions of 
normal non-employment life of this or any other person.'1 (Larsei 
38.83 (b) The following quotes from the Allen case makes this 
clear: 
We also accept Larson's suggestion that the 
comparison between the usual and unusual exertion 
be defined according to an objective standard. 
Note that the comparison is not with this 
employee's usual exertion in his employment but 
with the exertions of normal non-employment life 
of this or any other person. 729 P.2d 27) 
Thus the precipitating exertion must be compared 
with the usual wear and tear and exertions of non-
employment life, not the non-employment life of 
the particular worker. (p. 27) 
In evaluating typical non-employment activity, the 
focus is on what typical non-employment activities 
are generally expected of people in today's 
society, not what this particular claimant is 
accustomed to doing. (p. 27) 
The Court went on to state that "typical activities an 
exertions expected of men and women" were carrying out full 
garbage cans, lifting baggage or a child, climbing stairs or 
changing a tire. 
Judge Sumsion has already typified claimant's law 
practice as generally more stressful than other attorneys'. The 
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Appeals Court can certainly take official notice that a law 
practice of the usual attorney and particularly that of Mr, McRa 
was far more stressful than the stress of exertions of non-
employment life of he or the usual man. This is also shown in 
the Judge Elton case. Also being required by his employer to 
continue to work even after having serious pains caused even 
greater anxiety and stress on Friday June 28 and Saturday June 
29 than could ever be conceived of in everyday non-employment 
life. 
POINT V: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ACTED ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY IN NOT REFERRING THE MATTER TO A 
MEDICAL PANEL AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE APPLICANT 
SUFFERED A HEART ATTACK DURING THE COURSE OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT. 
Section 35-1-77 U.C.A. provides that when there are 
medical questions, especially when there is a conflict in the 
medical evidence, the matter may be referred to a medical panel, 
The Administrative Law Judge should not act as the third medical 
expert in determining which of the medical experts' opinion is 
the most accurate and should be accepted. 
The facts set forth clearly indicate that the Applicai 
was engaging in extremely stressful activities on Friday, being 
involved in a deposition and two court trials, and under 
pressures to keep an appointment by driving out into the oil 
fields and then making proper preparations for another deposits 
the next day, which was a Saturday (of course, Saturday was the 
usual day of relaxing as a weekend activity). 
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POINT VI: ALL DOUBTS ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF A 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM DUE TO THE REMEDIAL 
NATURE OF SUCH LEGISLATION. 
The overriding principle which governs adjudication of 
Workers' Compensation disability claims is that such claims are 
to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits and that 
any doubts from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the 
claimant. Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362, 1363-6' 
(Utah 1980), citing Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 184 
^020, 1021-22 (Utah 1919). The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328, 332 
(Utah 1979) (Dissenting opinion). McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission , 56 7 P . 2 d 1 5 3 , 15 5 (I !: t a 1 i .1 9 ? 7 ) , Askrew v. Industrial 
Commission, 39 I I • 2 I 302, 304 (Utah 1 96 4). M & K Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1948). The 
Applicant respectfully requests that to the extent that the 
questions raised herein are close questions, that all such doubt: 
be resolved in favor of an award of benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
The claimant, McRae, was a hard driven trial attorney 
whose law practice was exceeding stressful, as shown by the 
transcript and acknowledged by the Judge and was certainly far 
more stressful than that of the non-employment life of the 
ordinary man, particularly on the dates of June 28 and 29, 1985, 
when he worked under the stress and anxiety of abdominal pains 
and finished his work on Saturday under the stress and anxiety 
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of knowing he was in the middle of a heart attack. That is an 
extreme and substantial stress. Neither the Judge, the 
Commission, nor Dr. Perry had a transcript of the hearing. 
The Commission, in considering the Motion for Review, 
did not have a transcript made up and did not have the facts 
available in its review. The Denial of the Motion for Review 
should be given very little weight in considering this appeal. 
Only Dr. Null, a heart specialist, knew McRae's full 
story and clearly stated the emotional stress and tension of his 
work caused an aggravation to produce his myocardial infarction. 
All tests are met for claimant to recover workman's compensation 
benefits. The Orders of the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Industrial Commission should be reversed and remanded to allow 
recovery of Workman's Compensation benefits to claimant. 
DATED this 16th day of February, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for the Applicant 
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PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE-INTERNAL MEDICINE 
DIPLOMATE. AMERICAN BOARD OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 
SUITE 3 F , ST. MARK'S OFFICE BUILDING 
1220 EAST 3 9 0 0 SOUTH STREET 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y , U T A H S-4t«-4 
T E L E P H O N E 2 6 3 - 3 8 9 2 
September 12, 1985 
Keith E. Sohm 
RULON T. BURTON & ASSOCIATES 
1935 E. Vine Street, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 Re: Robert M. McRae 
Dear Mr. Sohm: 
In response to your letter of September 5, 1985 the following information 
is submitted. 
Atheroscerotic heart disease, of course, is exacerbated under sypmtoms 
of angina pectorus or made much worse under periods of emotional stress, 
pressure and tension. Prolonged hours of activity, striking degree of physical 
exertion, exposure to cold, or marked emotional pressure and tension frequently 
result in increase symptoms referable to the heart. Mr. McRae has underlying 
atherosclerotic heart disease, and of course, all of the symptoms of that 
disorder can be made worse by heavy work loads and excessive emotional pressure 
and tension. If further details are needed, this office may be contacted. 
Very truly yours, 
F//Clyde Nulll, M.D., F. A.C.P. 
FCN/cb 
ADDENDUM 
\su0v" 
40 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing brief 
were personally delivered to the offices of the Industrial 
Commission, Erie Boorman of the Second Injury Fund, with a copy 
to Administrative Law Judge Richard G. Sumsion and a copy to 
Elliott K. Morris of the Workers Compensation Fund, this 16th da 
of February, 1988. 
Keith E. Sohm 
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£\UUULMJVl*l t* July 15, 1986 
According to the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment of the American Medical Association, 
Committee on Rating of Mental and Physical Impairment, copyright 1971, page 81- He exhibits a 35% impairment 
and Class II symptomatology on the basis of the above diagnosis. 
It is my opinion that he will continue to require medical therapy for this mil Hull i't likelihood of 
further improvement without additional surgery on medical therapy Is unlikely. 
I do not see any reason for additional surgical Intervention at this ixjint, and thl'j man continues to 
exhibit the symptomatology as indicated above. 
He exhibits this pennament physical impairment and will require continuing medical therapy for an 
indefinite period of time. In my opinion, the emotional stress and tension related to his occupation are 
certainly associated with an aggravation to produce his myocardial infarction. 
If further details are needed, this office nn be contacted. 
FOJ/bf 
cc: Robert McRae 
Enc. 
ADDENDUM 2 
.**. -CM J J Of 3 C . 0 4 
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McRAE S D E L A N D 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
THE WHITLEY M A N S I O N 
132 SOUTH 6 0 0 EAST 
HALLS CR0S5INC UTAH SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84102 
T E L E P H O N E (SOI) 6 S - * - 2 2 3 3 EXTENSION m T E L E P H O N E (SOD 364- 1333 
L O N I F D E L A N D 
September 1 8 , 1986 H C R S C H E L P S U L L E N 
C O N N I E MOWER 
Mr. Keith E. Sohm 
Attorney at Law 
2057 Lincoln Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Re: Robert M. McRae 
Injury: 6/28/85 
Dear Keith: 
I kept my appointments with Drs. McCann and Perry as 
scheduled on September 16, 1986. Dr. McCann appeared to be 
somewhat of a novice as to why he was involved. After taking 
a history and spending my one hour, he then re-read the 
medical questions posed to him to answer and then said I 
needed to take an MMPI test and see a Dr. Cooper, PHD, 
Psychitrist, in his office for some more tests. The earliest 
that this could be set was 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. on September 
17. When I learned that I needed to get back to Vernal, I 
took the written test earlier on the 17th, only to discover 
that Dr. Cooper was going to need an hour plus of my time and 
I couldn't stay that late in Salt Lake. I think this is very 
poor planning and feel that someone owes for some travel, time 
and expense as well as being away from work unnecessarily. 
Dr. Perry was a gross disappointment. His nurse took 
my blood pressure, weight, and put me in the examining room. 
Dr. Perry came in in about 10 minutes. He opened my file 
which had been sent to him by the Fund or Commission and 
immediately ask what he was supposed to do and why was he 
involved. He read the transmittal letter which contained, I 
believe, four questions for him to answer. He read through 
the file, which apparently was a copy of Dr. Null's office 
file dated back to 1970 which covered periodic routine 
physicals. He ask a few questions and I again re-told my 
story of the events leading up to my heart attact. He had me 
lie down on the examining table, listened to my heart with a 
stethoscope and told me to put my shirt back on. He then 
re-read the questions, the first one, if I remember, in 
substance ask for his opinion asking whehter or not work 
related stress contributed to the heart attack and then he 
3 0 9 EAST IOO NORTH 
VERNAL UTAH 84078 
T E L E P H O N E (SOD 7 8 9 - 1 6 6 6 
ROBERT M M c R A E 
J O A N N 8 a T R l N G H A M 
L A OEVER 
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September 18, 1986 
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mumbled "no". He read the other three questions and mumbled 
\f,yes" as to each. He then said he would read my file which he 
\had not read prior to my seeing him, and write his report,. 
Later in the afternoon 1 had occasion to talk to Dr. 
Null on the phone and described to him Dr. Perry's exam. Dr. 
Null indicated that Dr. Perry had a tendency to be abrupt and 
quick on decisions and that in his opinion, as I interpreted 
what Dr. Null said, Dr. Perry did not consider the entirety of 
the medical history in conjunction with the incicent of June 
29, 1985. Personally I belive Dr. Perry had inadequate 
medical history and further that any conclusions he jumped to 
were without any adequate foundation or physical exam. 
If you have not been supplied with copies of the 
physician question letters, I suggest that you obtain them and 
also find out what history information was supplied each 
doctor in order for them to formulate opinions. As soon as 1 
know when I will be in Salt Lake next I will make myself 
available to Dr. Cooper. 
Sincerely, 
Robert M. McRae 
RMM i pill 
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ADDh&DUM 4 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No: 85000739 
ROBERT M. MCRAE, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* 
vs. * 
MCRAE AND DELAND and/or * 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On June 22, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying the 
applicant in the above-captioned case workers compensation benefits related to 
a June 29, 1985 incident in the course of employment and subsequent triple 
by-pass heart surgery performed on July 1, 1985. The Administrative Law Judge 
denied all benefits because the Administrative Law Judge found that neither 
legal nor medical causation were established. The Administrative Law Judge 
cited the case Allen vs the Industrial Commission, 729 P2d 15 (Utah 1986) as 
authority for the proposition that both legal and medical cause must be 
established before an injury in the course of employment is compensable. The 
Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant's pre-existing 
arteriosclerotic heart condition required the applicant show that unusual 
exertion in the course of employment caused the need for the by-pass surgery 
in order to establish legal causation. The Administrative Law Judge found the 
events leading up to the hospitilization and surgery did not constitute 
unusual exertion. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge found legal 
causation was not established. Furthermore, the Administrative Law Judge 
found that the medical evidence taken as a whole, did not confirm that work 
related stress caused the need for surgery, and thus the Administrative Law 
Judge found no medical causation. As neither of the two elements of 
compensability were established (legal arid medical causation), the 
Administrative Law Judge found the June 29, 1985 incident was not 
compensable. 
On August 10, 1987, pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, counsel for the 
applicant filed a Motion for Review. Counsel for the applicant argues that 
aggravation of a pre-existing condition is compensable according to both 
statutory and case law. He states that any question regarding whether an 
aggravation occurred should be submitted to a medical panel for resolution and 
should not be decided by the Administrative Law Judge. Counsel for the 
applicant cites numerous pre-Allen Supreme Court cases as authority for the 
proposition that only usual exertion is required for a finding of 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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compensability. On the other hand, counsel for the applicant maintains that 
the applicant was exposed to unusual exertion leading up to the by-pass 
surgery in the form of work related stress. Counsel for the applicant cites 
pre-Allen cases involving facts similar to the facts of the instant case as 
authority for the conclusion that stress can be exertion. Counsel for the 
applicant concludes that the work related stress the applicant experienced was 
unusual exertion which aggravated his pre-existing arteriosclerotic heart 
disease causing the need for by-pass surgery. Therefore, counsel for the 
applicant finds the June 29, 1985 wot k stress resulting in coronary 
insufficiency is compensable. 
On August 17, 1987, counsel foe the defendant/Workers Compensation 
Fund filed a Response to the applicant's Motion for Review. Counsel for the 
defendant states U.C.A. 35-1-77*s permissive language gives the Administrative 
Law Judge the discretion whether to refer a medical question to a medical 
panel for resolution. Counsel for the defendant states it is therefore not 
improper for the Administrative Law Judge to determine no medical panel 
referral is necessary and to decide the case based oi i medical evidence 
submitted at the hearing. Because there was medical evidence submitted that 
supports the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the events leading up to 
the surgery were not the legal or medical cause for the need for surgery, 
CQunsel for the defendant maintains it was proper for the Administrative Law 
Judge to rely on that evidence in denying benefits. 
The Commission finds that the issues to be resolved on review are 
whether legal and medical cause are established by the facts in the instant 
case. This case presents the unique question regarding what amount of mental 
stress will objectively be considered unusual exertion so as to establish 
legal causation. This case also presents the difficult question of how to 
decide medical causation where even the medical experts decline to pinpoint a 
definitive cause for the internal failure. Many of the points made by counsel 
for the applicant in the Motion for Review are not contested. The Commission 
agrees pre-existing conditions aggravated by a work injury can be compensated 
and the Commission agrees mental stress can be considered exertion. The 
issues involved here are whether the facts in this case show the mental stress 
amounted to unusual exertion and whether the mental stress medically caused an 
aggravation of the, arteriosclerotic cornoary condition. Because the Allen 
case significantly changed the elements of compensability with respect to 
industrial injuries, just reviewing pre-Allen cases with similar facts is 
insufficient for purposes of determining compensability in this case. The 
Allen unusual exertion legal causation standard and the element of medical 
causation are the key issues here. 
In applying the unusual exertion legal causation standard, applicable 
to this case due to the pre-existing arteriosclerotic heart disease, the 
Commission must admit it is very difficult to determine what constitutes 
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unusually exertive mental stress as compared to what the average person 
encounters on a daily basis in non-employment life. The question becomes was 
the applicant's busy schedule as a trial attorney more mentally stressful than 
the average person's non-employment mental stresses of for example social 
confrontations, financial problems and/or the stress of raising children. 
This is a particularly perplexing problem and the Commission finds it 
difficult to weigh one mental stress against another objectively. To resolve 
the dilemma, the Commission must resort back to the language in Allen. 
To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a 
pre-existing condition must show that the employment 
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he 
already faced in everyday life because of his condition. 
This additional element of risk in the work place is 
usually supplied by an exertion greater than that 
undertaken in normal, everyday life. This extra exertion 
serves to offset the pre-existing condition of the employee 
as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims 
for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than 
exertions at work. 
The Commission finds the key language here is "contributed something 
substantial" to the risk already faced. If the work place does contribute 
something substantial, then legal cause is established. So the question 
becomes, did the applicant's work place stress contribute something 
substantial that increased the risk of heart failure that the applicant 
already faced due to his pre-existing condition. 
The question must be answered by viewing the medical evidence. Both 
doctors who review the question of contribution of work stress find work 
stress as one of a number of contributing factors to the risk of heart failure 
the applicant faced. The Administrative Law Judge chose to rely on Dr. 
Perry's statement as follows; 
The question of chronic job stress is a different issue. I 
think that there was a much greater contribution to his 
premature coronary artherosclerosis from his heavy 
cigarette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and his facial 
xanthoma, as well as his type-A hard-driving personality 
than one could attribute to his job as an attorney. 
Counsel for the applicant cites Dr. Null's statement as follows: 
In my opinion, the emotional stress and tension related to 
his occupation are certainly associated with an aggravation 
to produce his mild myocardial infarction. 
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Dt Perry's statement looks to quantifying how substantial the work stress 
factor was in comparison to the pre-existing factors. Dr. Null's does not. 
Because the issue needing resolution, according to the above-cited language 
from Allen, is whether the work contribution is substantial, the Commission 
finds the Administrative Law Judge properly relied on the medical evidence 
that best addresses the question of how substantial the work contribution 
was. Furthermore, just from a logical standpoint, where there are still 5 
major risk factors present even in the absence of the work stress factor, it 
would seem adding one more factor is not a substantial contribution. The 
Commission also finds that Dr. Null's opinion is not completely at odds with 
that of Dr. Perry. Dr. Perry merely elaborates more definitively in his 
analysis. As such, the Commission finds it was not mandatory that a medical 
panel be appointed to resolve a medical controversy as no true controversy is 
evident. The Commission finds the Administrative Law Judge correctly 
determined legal causation was not established as the work stress did not 
contribute substantially tc the i 13k of tieart failure. Because legal 
causation is not established, there is no need to review the issue regarding 
medical causation. Based on the failure to establish one of the necessary 
elements of compensability, legal causation, the Commission finds the 
Administrative Law Judge's denial of benefits should be affirmed. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's August 10, 198 7 Motion 
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's June 22, 1987 Order is 
hereby affirmed and fnnl with further appeal ID the Court of Appeal:* only 
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pursuant to u i; n ID-J S 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Ut^ Jt), Salt Lake^i^y, U£ah, this 
ATTEST: 
day oi X/m^mtfA/ 1987, 
__,— ^ff 
Linda J . Sinrasburg f 
Commissio^i Secre ta ry / 
AUU&IHUUM D 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CASE No. 85000739 
* 
ROBERT M. MCRAE, * 
* 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
VS. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
MCRAE & DELAND and/or * AND ORDER 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 16, 
1987, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Richard G. Sums ion, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and represented by Keith E. 
Sohm, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Elliot K. Morris, 
Attorney at Law. 
The issues in this case are as follows: 
1. Was the stress of the applicant's employment as an 
attorney on June 28-29, 1985, the cause of the heart 
attack sustained at that time? 
2. Does the stress to which the applicant was subjected 
on or before June 28, 1985, fulfill the requirements 
of legal causation and medical causation as defined in 
the recent case of Allen v. Industrial Commission? 
3. If so, what benefits is the applicant entitled to 
under the Workers Compensation Act? 
48 
ROBERT MCRAE 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
F LNDEiMGG OF bACT: 
1. The applicant is a practicing trial attorney with offices LL 
Vernal, Utah and Salt Lake City, Utah. On June 28-29, 1985, the applicant 
sustained a severe heart attack during the course of his employment. The 
diary or schedule kept by his secretary shows that on June 28, 1985, he was 
scheduled for depositions in the morning, two trials in the Circuit Court, and 
a meeting with a client in the oil fields. Forty-five minutes after lunch, he 
had severe stomach pains prompting him to go to the Ashley Valley Medical 
Center. He had blood drawn and underwent an EKG and was told a serum test 
would be made. To his knowledge, he went to the oil field to meet with his 
client. Upon his return, he still didn't feel very good. He had dinner 
downtown, because his wife was in Salt Lake City. The hospital explained to 
him the reason for the blood serum test. Apparently they suspected an ulcer 
condition. He decided not to stay in the hospital, even though he had been 
asked to do JO The following morning, June 29, 1985, he returned to the 
Ashley Valley Medical Center for a repeat blood test and another EKG. He then 
went to his office, because he was scheduled to be involved in depositions. 
2. The applicant proceeded with the depositions the morning of June 
2'i, 1985, but around 11:00 a.m., Dr. Norman Nielsen called from the hospital 
ar I informed the applicant he was having a heart attack and he was to ^ t t 
the hospital immediately. He finished the deposition in which he was involved 
and then sent his secretary home to get some clothes. He then drove three 
blockJ to thin hospital. He was then sent by lifeline to Salt Lake City, where 
he was admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital. He recalls very little that 
happened after that for a period of some fourteen days. He underwent a triple 
bypass surgery on July 1, 1985 He was told Hiat he came very close to dying 
on a couple of occasions. He was released from the hospital on July 16, 
1985. He returned to active practice around August 12, 1985, but on a limited 
basis, avoiding cour:. appearances, and has continued to ao so to the present 
time. 
3. The applicant has a long documented history of prior heart 
disease, dating back fifteen years or so prior to the incident in question. 
The risk factors contributing to his coronary atheroscerosis include heavy 
cigarette smoking, high cholesterolemia, facial xanthoma, heavy drinker of 
alcoholic beverages, type "A" personality, high blood pressure, and employment 
as a hard-driving, self-employed attorney who has been engaged in heavy trial 
work for morn than twenty five years 
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4. It is difficult to quantify the stress associated with the 
applicant's particular practice of law. It is probably safe to assume that it 
was a more stressful practice than engaged in by most attorneys, but there is 
no indication that it was uniquely stressful. Chronic job stress is 
considered by cardiologists as one of the factors contributing to coronary 
atheroscerosis. As with many of the stress factors, they usually do not have 
an acute impact upon the development of the disease, but the long-term impact 
appears to be borne out in numerous case histories. 
5. The nurses' notes at the Ashley Valley Medical Center, recorded 
on June 28, 1985, are significant. They indicate he was 
"admitted with complaints of chest pain since Sunday. 
He states that the pain comes and goes and also has 
complaints of pain to both arms." 
See Exhibit "D-l", p. 83. There is some dispute as to whether or not he 
really complained of chest pains, or simply informed the nurse by pointing to 
his chest and across his shoulders, and this was construed as a description of 
chest pain. 
6. The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges the use of such terms 
as "heart attack" and "myocardial infarction" in this Order and in various 
medical records is accurate only in the broadest sense of those terms. More 
accurately, his condition is described as atherosclerotic heart disease and 
pending myocardial infarction with findings consistent with severe coronary 
insufficiency. Angiography performed on June 30th showed high grade stenosis 
of the three arteries in which bypass surgery was performed. The applicant 
had severe respiratory difficulties after surgery in addition to other 
problems and he was in the intensive care unit much longer than is normally 
the case. 
7. In dealing with the causation factors associated with the 
applicant's heart attack, it is important to understand the conflict of 
opinion that exists. Applicant's cardiologist, Dr. F. Clyde Null, offered the 
following explanation in response to an inquiry from applicant's attorney: 
"Atheroscerotic heart disease, of course, is exacer-
bated under symptoms of angina pectorus or made much worse 
under periods of emotional stress, pressure and tension. 
Prolonged hours of activity, striking degree of physical 
exertion, exposure to cold, or marked emotional pressure 
and tension frequently result in increased symptoms refer-
able to the heart. Mr. McRae has underlying atheroscler-
otic heart disease, and of course, all of the symptoms of 
that disorder can be made worse by heavy work loads and 
excessive emotional pressure and tension." 
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8 Or J Joseph Perry, who is also a specialist in cardiology, 
offered tht iul lowing explanation in response to an inquiry from the insurance 
adjuster: 
"There was nu change in his job requirements, the 
physical activity, number or hours worked, or stresses in 
the months prior to his myocardial infarction, compared to 
the years before this occurred. Therefore, there is no 
causal relationship of an acute nature with his myocardial 
infarction. The question of chronic job stress is a 
different issue. I think that there was a much greater 
contribution to his premature coronary atherosclerosis from 
his heavy cigarette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and 
his facial xanthoma, as well as his type-A, hard-driving 
personality than one could attribute to his job as an 
attorney " 
(J Al im considering the foregoing possible scenarios and the 
importance of the role of stress, thp Administrative Law Judge finds no 
convincing evidence of any unusual or acute stress with regard to the 
applicant's work activities on the date of, or preceding, the onset of the 
symptoms which led to hi'-, hospitalization and eventual bypass surgery. This 
is not to say that he was not working under stressful circumstances. To the 
contrary, as noted previously, the applicant's type and style of practice 
could justifiably be characterized as more stressful than most attorneys. It 
does not appear, however, as pointed out by Dr. Perry, that during the last 
week of June, 1985 there was any significant change in his job requirements, 
the level )f his physical activity, the number or hours worked, or the 
stresses he had experienced in the months prior thereto. It is also 
significant to note that the history taken at the St. Mark's Hospital on June 
29, 1985, on the date of his admission is as follows: 
"This gentleman on 5-23-85 [6-23-85] noted the onset 
of substernal epigastric pain following a day of rather 
significant physical exertion that persisted for a short 
period of time then remissed with no medication. On the 
day following, as he awoke, he again noted the same 
substernal pain persisting longer and more intense and 
[than] at this time of the day previously. His wife 
checked his pulse and was aware that it was irregular. On 
the day following the chest pain occurred and reoccurred 
intermittently with recurring episodes J£ discomfort 
substernal and attended by some element at shortness of 
breath. By Friday, the chest pain was intermittent, 
severe, radiating to his neck and to his arms and to his 
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wrists. This was occurring bilaterally, but more severe on 
the left arm. He was seen in the emergency room at the 
Ashley Valley Hospital. An EKG was obtained that is 
reported to have shown some T-wave inversion in 2, 3, and 
AVF. Enczymes were said to be normal. However, because of 
the chest pain persisting and because of the concern of the 
doctors, he was called on Saturday, 6-29-85 for a revisit 
to the emergency room, at which time the EKG changes were 
more pronounced with definite T-wave inversion in 2, 3, and 
AVF, but also an elevated CPK of 417 and a isoenczyme of 66 
constituting a 15% range. Because of the EKG changes and 
the enczyme changes, he was air-evacuated to St. Mark's 
Hospital for evaluation and admission for further 
diagnostic studies." (See Exhibit "D-l", p. 64). 
For the foregoing reasons, the Administrative Law Judge finds the applicant 
has failed to meet his burden of proof in showing the requirements of legal 
causation or medical causation as set forth in the recent Utah Supreme Court 
case of Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 25 (1986). Footnote 9 
referred to in the Allen decision is of particular significance when applied 
to the facts of this case. It reads: 
"Evidence of the ordinariness or unusualness of the 
employee's exertions may be relevant to the medical 
conclusion of causal connection. Where the injury results 
• from latent symptoms with an illness such as heart disease, 
proof of medical causation may be especially difficult. 
Larsen's treatise cites many examples of cases where 
compensation claims were defeated because of inadequate 
proof of medical causation. See Larson, supra, Para. 
38.83(i) at 7-319 to -321. Compare Guidry v. Sline, Indus. 
Pointers, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982) heart attack 
triggered by stress, exertion, and strain greater than 
sedentary life of average worker compensable. 
Admittedly, there is case authority on both sides of the issue. But, as 
applied to the facts of the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge finds 
the analysis and opinion of Dr. Perry more accurately reflects the causative 
factors leading to the applicant's hospitalization and bypass surgery, and the 
Administrative Law Judge adopts Dr. Perry's opinion as his own. In doing so, 
it should be noted that in analyzing the causative factors leading to heart 
problems, the risk factors are generally well know. Isolating which of those 
risk factors constitutes the actual cause appears to be an almost impossible 
task, but a consideration of the factors does allow for a considered opinion 
relative to the medical probabilities. The significance of this is emphasized 
by the Supreme Court's recent decision in the case of Lancaster v. Gilbert 
Development, filed April 20, 1987. 
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CONCLUSIONS i I LAW 
Only a portion nt the
 reIevant evidence LS reflected in the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, but ^uth is deemed sufficient to identify the issues and the 
basis for the determination that the applicant has failed to meet his burden 
of proof in establishing legal and medical causation. Accordingly, the claim 
of the applicant must necessarily bo denied. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of the applicant be, and the 
same is hereby, denied. 
II Lo FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for revit^ o£ the toregoing 
shall be filed In writing within fifteen (15) days J! the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sums ion-' 
Administrative Law Ijd^e 
Passea by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
rr^g*MS-day of June, 1987. 
ATTEST: 
Linda J. Strasbourg 
Commission S^iretary 
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which denied the application. On appeal, 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake Coun-
ty, Ferdinand Erickson, J., entered judg-
ment in favor of the widow's claim and 
the Retirement Board appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Hyde, District Judge, held 
that record in hearing supported trial 
court's conclusion that judge, who testi-
mony showed suffered a deterioration of 
health brought on by the stresses of highly 
sensitive cases handled by him during the 
last six weeks of his life, died as a result 
of an accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment 
Affirmed. 
Crockett, J., did not participate. 
MTHUMMt JTSTtM S> 
503 P.2d 137 
Inga-LIU ELTON, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, an 
agency of the State of Utah, De-
fendant and Appellant 
No. 12809. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
Nov. 15, 1972. 
Proceeding on application for widow's 
benefits to the State Retirement Board 
1. Appeal and Error <$=>1008.1(1), 1012.1(4) 
Trial court's findings will not be dis-
turbed unless clearly against weight of 
evidence or unless it manifestly appears 
that court has misapplied law to the es-
tablished facts. 
2. Judges C=22(ll) 
Record in hearing on claim of widow 
to the State Retirement Board for widow's 
benefits supported trial court's conclusion 
that judge, who testimony showed suffered 
a deterioration of health brought on by 
the stresses of highly sensitive cases han-
dled by him during the last six weeks of 
his life, died as a resulf of an accident aris-
6. State v. Davis, 121 Utah ISO, 210 P.2d 205. 
54 
El.IUN v UTAH STAT 
Cite as 28 
ing out of or in the course of his employ-
ment U.CA.1953, 49-7-4. 
K. Roger Bean, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ver-
non B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellant. 
Harold G. Christensen, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
HYDE, District Judge: 
The plaintiff is the widow of the late 
Judge Leonard Elton. Judge Elton died 
May 13, 1970, as a result of a stroke. 
Plaintiffs application for widow's benefits 
to the Utah State Retirement Board was 
denied Said administrative ruling was 
appealed to the district court, which court 
heard the case de novo and ruled in favor 
of the widow's claim and against the Utah 
State Retirement Board. 
[1] Appellant seeks reversal of the de-
cision* of the district court on the basis that 
Judge Elton died as a result of a disease 
and not as a result of an accident in that 
the evidence did not show some work-
related incident or accident, and further, 
that Judge Elton's stroke did not arise out 
of or occur in the course of his employ-
ment. The issue presented by this appeal 
is therefore simply whether the findings of 
the lower court are supported by compe-
tent evidence. It being a well settled rule 
28 UUf 2d—24 
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of judicial review that the trial court's 
findings will not be disturbed unless they 
arc clearly against the weight of the evi-
dence or it manifestly appears the court 
misapplied the law to the established facts. 
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 17 Utah 2d 251, 495 
P.2d 28. 
The legal structure within which the 
evidence is to be considered is the former 
judicial retirement act which provided as 
follows: 
Disability retirement compensation— 
widow's pension.—Any judge who has 
had 10 >ears of service and who is re-
tired on grounds of disability pursuant to 
Section 49-7-£(d) shall be entitled to the 
disability retirement compensation pio-
vided for in this act. Any judge, re-
gardless of the years of service, whose 
disability arises out of or in the course 
of performance of his judicial duties and 
the widow of every judge who is killed 
by accident or arising out of or in the 
course of his employment, wheresoever 
such injury occurred, shall be entitled to 
the disability retirement compensation or 
widows' pension, respectively, provided 
for in this act. [Section 49-7—1, U.CA. 
1953.] 
This court has previously determined 
that aggravation of a pre-existing disease 
by an industrial accident is compensable 
and that an internal failure brought about 
by exertion in the coure of emplo>ment 
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ma) be an accident within the meaning 
of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 
2d 140, 427 P.2d 740 (1967). The Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act employs 
language identical to that found in the 
Judges Retirement Act above quoted. 
The evidence at the trial shows that 
Judge Leonard Elton was appointed to the 
bench of the Third Judicial District in 1966. 
At the time he was in good health; there 
were no indications of ph\sical impair-
ment. He was not then and had not for 
many years been under medical care. On 
January 9, 1969 Judge Elton suffered a 
stroke. He was hospitalized for a time and 
then returned to part-time emplo>ment. 
By the fall of 1969 he had resumed his 
judicial duties and was working full time. 
On January 1, 1970 he assumed the re-
sponsibilities of presiding judge for the 
Third Judicial District. These responsi-
bilities substantially increased his work 
load. As presiding judge he assigned to 
himself several sensitive and difficult cases. 
From the time he resumed his full judicial 
duties until April 20, 1970 Judge Elton saw 
his doctor monthly without complaint or 
medical findings. On April 21, 1970 Judge 
Elton consulted his doctor, complaining of 
dizziness. He was clammy, unsteady in 
gait, and had experienced nausea and 
vomiting. I lis doctor believed he had suf-
fered a stroke. He sta\ed home ill the 
21st and 22nd of April. He rcfinied to 
REPORTS 
work on the 23rd to hear motions on a case 
which had aroused extreme public interest. 
He also worked April 24th, a holiday, hear-
ing extensive arguments in the same case. 
On Monday, April 27th, Judge Elton was 
again home ill. He saw his doctor on 
the 28th, who insisted he stay home for a 
week. On Wednesday, May 6th, he had 
returned to work carrying a full case load. 
On May 12th he made his ruling on the 
case which had aroused such public inter-
est, started a nonjury case, and heard an 
annulment and a divorce. He had a jury 
case scheduled for May 13th but died that 
morning. 
The persons who knew him best—his 
wife, his colleagues, his clerk, his bailiff, 
and the lawyers who practiced before him 
—all testified to the deterioration of his 
health, brought upon by the stresses of the 
highly sensitive cases handled by him 
during the last six weeks of his life. His 
physician testified that Judge Elton suf-
fered from vascular disease, resulting in 
insufficient blood supply to the brain, and 
that this condition was aggravated by the 
stresses of Judge Elton's emplo>ment, and 
that these stresses were the principal factor 
in cutting i>hort his life. 
under the tradition U rules of review the 
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judgment of that court will not be dis-
turbed. The judgment of the trial court 
is affirmed, no costs awarded. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and HEXRIOD, 
TCCKETT and ELLETT, JJ., concur. 
CROCKETT, J., having disqualified 
himself, does not participate herein. 
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